Away from socialism, towards Chinese characteristics: Confucianism and the futures of Chinese nationalism

Kelvin Chi-Kin Cheung

China Information 2012 26: 205
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X12440548

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://cin.sagepub.com/content/26/2/205

Published by:
SAGE
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for China Information can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://cin.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://cin.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://cin.sagepub.com/content/26/2/205.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Jun 17, 2012
What is This?
Away from socialism, towards Chinese characteristics: Confucianism and the futures of Chinese nationalism

Kelvin Chi-Kin Cheung
Hong Kong Institute of Education, China

Abstract
Following the success of China’s economic reform in the past few decades, Chinese nationalism has entered a new stage. The sentiment born of ‘the century of national humiliation’ is insufficient to explain the phenomenon of Chinese new nationalism. In this new era, China no longer regards the West as the benchmark against which it defines its success, but is becoming more assertive about its own values and perspectives. This emphasis on a Chinese perspective is related to the cultural shift in China’s post-socialist transition, where the source of legitimacy in China’s development has moved from an ideological dimension of socialism to a cultural dimension of ‘Chinese characteristics’. Following this transition, growing importance is being placed on an indigenous voice in many aspects of China’s development, including the recent efforts to reinvent traditional Chinese culture as a source of China’s soft power. In particular, with strong state sponsorship, Confucianism is being revived as a new nationalist discourse, which not only provides new discursive resources for continuing authoritarianism in mainland China, but also redefines governance and nation-building with respect to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Keywords
Chinese characteristics, Chinese nationalism, Confucianism, socialism, soft power

Chinese nationalism has received growing academic attention in the past few decades as China achieves success in economic reform. Many studies have pointed out that Chinese nationalism is linked to the continued production and consumption of ‘the century of national humiliation’ China suffered since the late Qing dynasty.¹ This sentiment is...
accompanied by the anxiety and desire for acceptance by the international community after China emerged from international isolation and the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980s. In other words, the Chinese nationalism that caught intellectual attention in the 1990s reflected more of an identity crisis in China than anything else, which Link identified as the ‘core problem’ of China in transformation. However, at the turn of the 21st century, this negative xenophobic sentiment born of past humiliation is no longer adequate for understanding Chinese nationalism in the new era. With the deepening of China’s economic reform in the 1990s, and the resulting increase in international influence, Chinese nationalism is entering a new stage, where China is showing greater confidence in projecting itself.

One of the manifestations of this newfound confidence is that, instead of continuing to rely on the West as the benchmark against which it defines its success, China is becoming more assertive in its own perspectives and values. This development corresponds to a cultural shift in China in which the importance of socialist ideology has given way to the notion of Chineseness, which is becoming a new source of legitimacy in China’s modernization. This cultural change is manifested in the growing enthusiasm in China for articulating a Chinese perspective in all endeavours concerning its development, especially the recent discussion of the ‘Chinese model’ and the intellectual trend in China’s academia to establish a Chinese school of social sciences. It also signifies a return to China’s cultural heritage for discursive resources for China’s modernization.

The revival of traditional Chinese culture in the past two decades, in particular Confucianism, is the result of this cultural change. After decades of criticism, Confucianism is once again being reinstated as a cultural icon to represent China; its revival has important implications for domestic governance in mainland China. It also defines a new approach to China’s nation building with respect to Hong Kong and Taiwan. This article will look at this proactive dimension of Chinese nationalism which has been developing for the past two decades. Before examining its implications for China’s development, the article will first outline the cultural shift with reference to China’s economic reform, particularly the changing dynamics of the reform discourse of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (有中国特色的社会主义).

China’s post-socialist transition

China’s reform and opening, which began in the late 1970s, has often been described as socialism with Chinese characteristics. This expression was first introduced by Deng Xiaoping when he announced the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics in his opening speech to the 12th Party Congress in September 1982. Since its first introduction, this reform discourse has served as the basis for China’s economic development, with its importance being reflected in its sustained position at the top tier of the Chinese Communist Party’s official formulations (提法).

Created in the early 1980s, this formulation marked a new era of modernization that departed from the Soviet model of the planned economy. At that time, resistance from conservatives remained strong, and reform progressed along a bumpy path. During that period, the main question dividing conservatives and reformists was whether or not
China should engage in economic market reforms. At that time reformers were concerned with overcoming the ideological barrier and silencing resistance from conservatives within the Party, who might otherwise have charged that economic reform was at the expense of socialism. By introducing the vaguely defined term ‘Chinese characteristics’, the reform discourse of socialism with Chinese characteristics provided the necessary flexibility for the Chinese leadership to engage in market reform without compromising the socialist ideology on which the Party’s legitimacy relied.

Building on this formulation, Deng’s view that it is possible for a market economy to operate in a socialist society became the bedrock of the economic reform.6 For instance, according to Long Yongtu, the chief negotiator of China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, Deng’s remark on the ‘socialist market economy’ was decisive in achieving a breakthrough in the WTO negotiations, and it resolved the question of whether China would implement a market economy in its reform.7 The role of this formulation, however, changed as economic reform deepened in the 1990s. China’s economic reform had suffered a significant setback after the military crackdown on the democratic movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Following the Tiananmen Incident, the atmosphere in China again became more conservative.8 It was not until Deng’s famous southern tour in 1992 that the momentum of reform was revived. Following Deng’s southern tour, reform took off once again with an increasing speed. This was accompanied by a growing frustration about widening income gaps and social injustice. The concern in the 1980s of whether or not China should engage in economic reform has given way to the question of how to achieve more effective reform. This concern about social equality corresponds to the discussion of how a Chinese model of development could alleviate the mounting social problems that have arisen in the course of China’s modernization. In this new circumstance, the need to adhere to socialism has become less important than the question of what Chinese characteristics mean.

The importance of the new discourse of Chinese characteristics is reflected in the wide use of the term. For instance, a statistical search of a newspaper and journal database in China shows that, between 1997 and 2006, 23,412 articles in major publications in China contained the term Chinese characteristics.9 Furthermore, the usage of the term is not limited to describing socialism, as in the original official formulation, but appears in relation to a wide variety of subjects. In the past, expressions such as ‘socialist development’ or ‘socialist higher education’ were common. Nowadays we are more likely to come across expressions such as ‘development with Chinese characteristics’ or ‘higher education with Chinese characteristics’. This suggests a gradual disconnection between Chinese characteristics and socialism and that the stress of the reform discourse of socialism with Chinese characteristics has shifted from socialism towards Chinese characteristics. In other words, once used as a means to overcome the ideological constraints imposed by socialism, the notion of Chinese characteristics now constitutes the new parameters within which China’s future development derives its legitimacy.

The transition in mainland China from an overarching socialist ideology to an emphasis on Chineseness is not merely a subtle change in the social consciousness of the people; it has also been actively promoted by the state through a reshaping of the cultural topography in everyday life rather than a reliance on hard propaganda. For instance, in late 2007, a new national holiday arrangement was proposed by the State Council.10
Under the new arrangement, the ‘Golden Week’ holiday for May Day (1 May) was cancelled and replaced by new national holidays during three traditional Chinese festivals.‘Golden Week’ is the popular name of the three weeklong holidays for Chinese New Year, Labour Day, and National Day (1 October). The original national holiday arrangement began in 1999 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. It was designed to boost domestic tourism and consumption in order to achieve faster economic recovery following the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Ever since its inception, it has become an important reference point in people’s lives, especially for the millions of migrant workers, as these weeklong holidays are their only opportunities to return home to see their families. As such, the impact of the new holiday arrangement is significant in the social life of the majority of people in mainland China.

According to the official explanation, the aim in cancelling the May Day Golden Week was to counter the growing problems associated with long holidays, such as overloading the transportation system as a result of the massive scale of mobility and tourism. However, the decision to cancel the May Day Golden Week, while keeping those for Chinese New Year and National Day, suggests that a more accurate interpretation is the intention of the central government to play down the importance of class consciousness, which had been the dominant ideology in China. Nevertheless, not all local authorities share the same perspective as the central government. In early March 2009, Huang Huahua, the governor of Guangdong Province, announced an alternative policy to reinstate the May Day ‘Golden Week’ in his province. Again, the decision was intended to boost domestic consumption in response to a decline in exports resulting from the global economic downturn in the midst of the financial crisis in the United States and Europe in late 2008. Following Guangdong’s announcement, other provinces exhibited a similar interest in reinstating the previous holiday arrangement. The decision of Guangdong, however, was criticized by the central government in an announcement that reiterated the importance of its new national holiday arrangements. The rigid stance of the central government in upholding the new arrangement, despite its negative effect on the economic imperative during the global financial crisis, reflects the importance that the ruling authority places on ideological transition in the post-socialist era. This is also seen in the growing emphasis on a Chinese perspective and the revival of traditional Chinese culture, in particular Confucianism, in recent decades.

China with Chinese characteristics

The emphasis on a Chinese perspective is reflected in the growing interest in the Chinese development model in recent years. The discussion of the Chinese model began with the idea of ‘Beijing Consensus’, a term coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in a report published by London’s Foreign Policy Centre in 2004. It has been taken up by Chinese scholars as an important basis for claiming the existence of a distinct ‘Chinese model’. This Beijing Consensus was created as an answer to the Washington Consensus; a set of neoliberal economic policies that emphasize fiscal constraint, the liberalization of capital markets, and the removal of trade barriers which were formulated by the IMF and the World Bank and imposed on Third World countries as conditions attached to loans. These policies have been widely criticized, and they have been attributed to an
exacerbation of problems faced by some developing countries.16 Thus, the development experience of China’s economic reform is being praised as providing an alternative political and economic model that allows countries to develop and remain independent from Western prescriptive economic policies.17 This Chinese model received even greater attention following the financial crisis that originated from the credit crunch in the United States that swept through major economies in the West in late 2008.

Originally, this Chinese model of development referred to the 30 years of experience that China has accumulated since it initiated reform and opening up in the late 1970s. However, there has been a renewed assessment of this Chinese development model in recent years. According to the new interpretation, the Chinese model not only describes China’s development after opening up but also the socialist development during the first 30 years of the People’s Republic.18 Contrary to the perspective that considers the socialist experiment under Mao as disastrous, proponents of the 60-year Chinese development model argue that the first 30 years of China’s development laid the foundation for China’s economic success during the period of reform and opening. Not many people will dispute the success of China’s economic development in the past three decades. However, the new interpretation that associates China’s socialist development in the first 30 years of new China as part of the Chinese development model reflects a significant leap in the level of confidence in China about its own development.

This new confidence has inspired a growing emphasis on an indigenous perspective in China’s modernization. For instance, the recent policy change that favours indigenous technological innovation is an example of the policy implication of this new emphasis of Chineseness initiated at the state level.19 The same assertiveness can also be found at the intellectual level as there is growing enthusiasm in China’s academia to develop knowledge of the social sciences which is grounded in Chinese culture as well as the experiences of the development in modern China, with the goal of developing a so-called Chinese school of social sciences. In 2008, Fudan University in Shanghai established the Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences (IAS-Fudan). Unlike institutes of a similar nature in other parts of the world, the IAS-Fudan has the stated mission of advancing the Chinese perspective on social scientific knowledge. The founding director stated in his inaugural speech that the study of social sciences in China needs to go beyond importing and copying Western social sciences; it should move from seeking to converge with the West to engaging in concrete dialogue and academic exchange with Western social sciences. In order to have genuine dialogue, the study of social sciences in China should develop its own voice.20

This emphasis on a Chinese perspective in social sciences study is particularly strong in the discipline of international relations. Recently, the question of whether there should be a Chinese school of international relations theory has received much attention both in China and abroad. Two main factors have contributed to this development. First of all, the discipline of international relations has long been regarded as Eurocentric, and the contemporary development of the discipline has been dominated by American social science.21 Existing critique from the Western philosophical tradition has already offered a sophisticated challenge to mainstream theories. In recent years, more attention has been paid to the challenge coming from outside the West. In particular, international relations scholars have begun to ask why there is no non-Western international relations theory.22 Secondly,
the development of international relations study in China follows a similar retreat from Western scholarship. Before the reform and opening, international relations study in China was mainly based on the study of Chinese diplomatic history and Marxist international relations theory. This was replaced by international relations scholarship from the West, which was imported to China through translated works during the 1980s and 1990s. However, since the late 1990s, international relations scholars in China have begun to reflect on the development of China’s international relations study. They began to question the universal applicability of mainstream international relations theory, and changed from uncritically embracing Western international relations theories to exploring the Chinese approach in the study of international relations. Following this trend, recent publications by Chinese international relations scholars have often emphasized the Chinese perspective in their analyses. As Cunningham-Cross shows, Chinese traditional cultural resources are being reinvented in the process to pave the way for China’s ascent to power.

This reinvention of Chinese culture is not so much about helping others to understand China than about establishing China’s discursive power. With China’s growing economic and political influence, the central government is keen to establish its discursive power in world politics, and to counter the dominance of Western cultural values that Beijing has found increasingly restrictive. Traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, becomes the main source which China draws from to enhance its influence on the cultural front.

Confucianism: A new nationalist discourse

The revival of Confucianism in the past few decades is in line with China’s effort to develop its own voice. During the 1980s, academic interest in Confucianism in mainland China was influenced by the development of New Confucianism advanced by overseas Chinese Confucian scholars. The interest in Confucianism also appeared at the popular level, with the so-called ‘cultural fever’ (文化熱), which saw a revival of the study of the Confucian classics. At that time, the question of whether Confucianism should be regarded as a religion was raised, generating a heated debate among leading scholars in China. Confucianism received even greater attention at the beginning of the new century, both at the popular and the state level. The interest in Confucianism at the popular level was highlighted by the rise of Yu Dan to prominence in the media. An associate professor at Beijing Normal University, Yu Dan gave a series of lectures on The Analects in a China Central Television programme in late 2006, and her book on the Confucian classics was a best-seller. At the state level, there has been a growing official presence at rituals and ceremonies in honour of Confucius in the recent years. In early 2008, it was announced that a ‘Chinese Cultural Symbolic City’, costing over RMB 30 billion, was to be built in Confucius’s hometown in Shandong Province. Confucianism has also been institutionalized through the establishment of the National Studies Institute at home and Confucius Institutes abroad. In October 2005, the first National Studies Institute was established at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, and, since the founding of the first Confucius Institute in Seoul in 2004, 322 institutes have been established in 91 countries and regions, with the mission of spreading Chinese culture and language in
different parts of the globe. Confucianism in this new era is becoming a cultural ambassador for overseas consumption to help develop China’s discursive power abroad. Apart from that, it also provides an important cultural resource for the ruling authority to relocate the legitimacy of authoritarian rule from the Leninist ideology back to Chinese tradition, and to define the new paternalistic relations of the ‘family-nation’ for Hong Kong and Taiwan in China’s state building.

Confucian authoritarianism

Confucianism was an important governing tool in imperial China. Its status as the dominant political doctrine in Chinese public life fell only after the abolition in 1905 of the imperial examination system which was based on the Confucian classics. With the recent revival of Confucianism, its role as a political doctrine is being explored by Chinese intellectuals as a replacement for the waning socialist ideology. This also comes at a time when the pragmatic approach of using economic prosperity to sustain political legitimacy is being undermined by the growing social injustice accompanying economic development. This systematic exploration of Confucianism as China’s new political doctrine was first made in Jiang Qing’s Political Confucianism (政治儒學) published in 2003. Jiang proposed a third way in China’s political transition, between the socialist ideology that had already lost its appeal among the general public and liberal democracy which the Party fiercely rejects. Confucianism is an ideal candidate as it remains one of the most important traditions in China, and for political transitions to secure political legitimacy, it must be rooted in China’s existing cultural resources.

Similar to Jiang, another political scientist, Kang Xiaogang, also proposed adopting Confucianism as a third way to China’s political transition. However, unlike Jiang, who thinks that Confucianism could offer an alternative to the status quo, Kang suggests that Confucianism could be used to provide discursive resources for China’s continued authoritarianism through the idea of ‘benevolent governance’ (仁政). The logic behind benevolent governance is that the different social classes specified in the Confucian hierarchical order have specific responsibilities; those who are higher up should act in a benevolent way towards those below in return for their support and legitimacy. This idea of benevolent governance was translated into the political discourse when the Chinese leadership popularized the slogan ‘putting people first’ (以民為本) and when ‘people-based politics’ (民本政治) became its new governing principle in mainland China. What people-based politics means is that political power continues to belong to the state, but the government that holds the monopoly on power will govern in accordance to the preferences and needs of the people. Under this doctrine of minben (民本), political participation of the people is limited to conveying their concerns to the political leaders. People-based politics is now being used to replace political reform and democratization in China, and recently it has been praised as the political foundation of the success of the Chinese development model.

Since power is monopolized under people-based politics, the main problem remains one of incentive, or the question of why the ruling authority is willing to act benevolently when there is no inherent cost to do otherwise. As a substitute to effective checks and balances of political power, the Chinese leadership continues to rely on traditional tactics
to promote certain ethical codes. For instance, in early 2005, the Party initiated the programme, ‘Education on maintaining the progressiveness of Communist Party members’ (保持共產黨員先進性教育), to sustain the moral standard of the Party cadres. In the following year, Hu Jintao issued his new moral doctrine – eight honours and eight shames (八榮八恥) – to the wider public. Similarly, promoting Confucianism is just one of these attempts to use cultural values to soothe the rising discontent in Chinese society.

Confucian family-nation

Confucianism as an important cultural resource not only legitimizes authoritarian rule in mainland China, it also serves as an important primordial tie for the overseas Chinese. As Wang Gungwu, a prominent historian on the overseas Chinese, notes:

New Confucianism can help to build a new sense of identity among the Chinese, thus contributing to the reunification not merely of territory, but also of the hearts and souls of the peoples of Taiwan and Hong Kong with those of their compatriots on the Mainland.

Confucianism, however, has a greater role than merely serving as a cultural identity to bond Chinese people in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is being used to redefine China’s relationship with Hong Kong, and also Taiwan in the future, by offering a new interpretation to the principle of ‘one country, two systems’.

When the principle of one country, two systems was first introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, no reference was made to Confucianism. The principle was applied to Hong Kong to ensure a high level of autonomy of the new Special Administrative Region after the handover. The interpretation of the principle, however, changed after Beijing adopted a hands-on approach to the political affairs of Hong Kong in the aftermath of the political crisis in 2003 that led to the premature termination of the second term of Tung Chee-hua’s administration. A legal scholar attached to the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong adroitly explains how Confucianism constitutes the core idea of one country, two systems:

The selfless assistance that the Central government has given to Hong Kong is similar to the care parents give to their children…. Building political order on the human heart, and on the most natural sentiment, is without doubt our political tradition of Confucianism. It is also this tradition that sustains ‘China’ itself…. The state is formed on the basis of family, a group that is bonded together by emotion. ‘The big family of the motherland’ (祖国大家庭), ‘the brothers and sisters of the fifty-six ethnic groups are one family’ (五十六族兄弟姐妹是一家), ‘the brotherhood of class’ (阶级兄弟), ‘compatriot brothers and sisters’ (同胞兄弟), ‘blood relations’ (血浓于水), these familiar words in the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party fuse the Confucius political tradition into the modern state construction. In the same sense, ‘one country, two systems’ is also built on the political thought of the Confucian tradition.

In this new interpretation, the state is formed on the basis of family. This Confucian ‘family’ value implies that the moral hierarchy in a society is similar to the one espoused
in the idea of benevolent governance, in which a paternalistic style of governance is legitimized, and individual rights are subordinated to the collective well-being of this ‘family-nation’. This reinterpretation seeks to make one country, two systems a principle which is supposed to safeguard the autonomy of Hong Kong, a source of legitimacy for Beijing’s growing interference in Hong Kong’s internal affairs, and it is made at a time when there is growing demand for democracy in the territory.

This new interpretation of the principle of one country, two systems reflects the ongoing post-socialist transition in China where communist rhetoric is increasingly blended together with Confucianism; class struggle has given way to the importance of Confucian values, which forms a new ruling legitimacy of the Chinese nation. This is also in line with the growing enthusiasm of the ruling communist regime to use Chinese traditional cultural resources to discursively displace values such as human rights and democracy in China’s modernization.

Concluding remarks

The Beijing Olympics in 2008 may have been the spectacle that marked the new confidence of China in the eyes of many foreigners. But this growing confidence in China is a much more subtle and gradual development that is part of China’s post-socialist transition. Beneath the surface of the Western-bashing, xenophobic sentiments displayed in recent protests by Chinese citizens lies a new sentiment that is firmly rooted in Chineseness, which shows that Chinese nationalism is entering a new stage in the 21st century. This new assertiveness in China points in a specific direction; it aims at re-establishing a Chinese perspective after being forced to abandon its tradition and to learn from the West for more than a century.

This article tries to understand this cultural shift in contemporary Chinese society and to explore the implication of the recent revival of Confucianism in the process. This transition, of course, is not one-sided. The uncertainty about the role Confucianism plays in contemporary Chinese politics is vividly shown in the abrupt disappearance of the statue of Confucius three months after its prominent display at the north-east corner of Tiananmen Square outside the National Museum in January 2011 – an indication of the absence of a consensual view within the Party leadership on the value of Confucianism in furthering the Party’s political agenda. On the other hand, the socialist tradition that had dominated the political scene in China continues to show its resilience despite being marginalized in a society increasingly defined by the ethos of capitalism. As Pieke’s article shows, socialist tradition is reinvented within the Party apparatus as a means to cope with the growing public discontent towards the depreciating morality and discipline in the revolutionary party. This is also seen in the recent revival of ‘red culture’ in Chongqing, a move that is often interpreted as a power struggle among political factions within the Party. Nevertheless, the source of political legitimacy in this new era will no longer be monopolized by socialist ideology, and the legitimacy provided by Chinese cultural tradition will prove to be a new impetus for China’s future development, despite the fact that how it will be adopted and interpreted remains uncertain.
Notes

I would like to thank Bill Callahan and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on an earlier draft.


5. In Chinese politics, the term ‘formulation’ (*tifa*) is the proper terminology used to refer to discourse. For a study of the power of language formulation in China, see Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992.

6. Deng Xiaoping stressed on different occasions that it is possible for the market to operate in a socialist economy. The most noteworthy occasion was on his tour to the southern cities in 1992, see Deng, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, vol. 3, 148, 203, 364, 367, and 373.

7. See Long Yongtu’s article, Jiari jingji quanqiuhua de jingzheng – Zhongguo jiari Shimao zuzhi hou de duice (Entering the competition of economic globalization – China’s strategy after entering the WTO), *Changzhang jingli ribao* (Factory managers economic daily), 5 February 2001.


11. The three Chinese festivals are *duan wu* (Dragon boat festival) – which commemorates Qu Yuan, a patriot and literary scholar in the Warring States period; *qing ming* – a day on which respect is paid to ancestors; and *zhong qiu* (Mid-autumn festival) – a day for family reunions.

12. It was created by combining the three-day national holiday with the two weekends immediately before and after to allow the public to have seven consecutive days of holiday.

13. Huang Huahua: Guangdong ‘1st May’ tieding fang qi tian jia’ (Huang Huahua: Guangdong is determined to have 7 days’ holiday on 1st May), *Nanfang dushibao* (Southern metropolitan daily), 7 March 2009, http://gd.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-03/07/content_4966918.htm, accessed 2 February 2012. The alternative method allows workers to combine three days of national holidays with two days of the weekend before or after 1st May and two days of annual leave.


19. See Paul Irwin Crookes’s article in this special issue.


24. See, for example, the series Zhongguo xuezhe kan shijie (World politics: Views from China) edited by Wang Jisi, the dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, Beijing: Xinshijie chubanshe.


26. Interview with a Chinese international relations scholar, Beijing, 26 November 2010.


40. As pointed out by Liu Xiaobo, a prominent Chinese dissident who was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, numerous satirized versions of Hu Jintao’s new moral doctrine ridiculed the government’s attempt to set the moral standard for the people. See Liu Xiaobo, Bei xixue de qinding rongru guan (Designated moral doctrine is being ridiculed), http://boxun.com/hero/liuxb/532_1.shtml, accessed 15 July 2009.
42. In 2003, the hard-handed approach of Tung’s administration to legislate the unpopular anti-subversion law, which many feared would threaten the freedom of expression in Hong Kong, resulted in a mass protest of half a million people. For a discussion of the change in Beijing’s approach to Hong Kong after the protest, see the article by a former member of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee who worked on Hong Kong’s and Macao’s Basic Law issues, Cheng Jie, The story of a new policy, *Hong Kong Journal*, no. 15, July 2009, http://www.hkjournal.org/archive/2009_fall/1.htm, accessed 12 December 2009.
44. See Frank Pieke’s article in this special issue.

References


Huang Huahua: Guangdong ‘1st May’ tieding fang qi tian jia’ (Huang Huahua: Guangdong is determined to have 7 days’ holiday on 1st May) (2009) *Nanfang dushibao* (Southern metropolitan daily), 7 March. http://gd.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-03/07/content_4966918.htm, 2 February 2012.


